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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Douglas Richard Nay appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Nay contends the district court
erred in (1) denying his request for the appointment of post-conviction counsel,
(2) summarily dismissing his petition, and (3) denying his request for counsel on
appeal.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court recited the underlying fact of Nay's criminal convictions
as follows:
In FE-2010-0009990, [Nay) was charged with Vehicular
Manslaughter and felony Possession of a Controlled Substance. In
FE-2010-12576, [Nay) was charged with two counts of delivery of
methamphetamine. The cases were consolidated before [the
district court]. [Nay) entered a guilty plea in the Manslaughter Case
on October 6, 2010 and a guilty plea to one count of Delivery of a
Controlled Substance in the Delivery case on October 12, 2010.
On the Vehicular Manslaughter case, the plea bargain
contemplated that the State would recommend a sentence of
thirteen years with no fixed portion, with dismissal of the second
count of methamphetamine possession. It was also agreed that he
would plead guilty in FE 2010-12576 to one count of Delivery of a
Controlled Substance, the remaining charge would be dismissed,
and the State would recommend a sentence of fifteen years to life.
In each case, it was agreed that [Nay] could ask for any lesser
sentence he wished. In addition to being examined by the Court on
his pleas on two separate dates, [Nay) executed a written Guilty
Plea Advisory Form with respect to each separate case. The State
did not pursue a persistent violator enhancement. [Nay) was
sentenced to ten years fixed followed by five years indeterminate
on the Vehicular Manslaughter conviction. He was sentenced to
seven years fixed up to life or the Delivery of a Controlled
Substance with the sentences for each case concurrent.
Thereafter, [Nay] filed motions for sentence reduction which were
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denied. The sentences were appealed and the [Court of Appeals]
affirmed in 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 615.
(R., p.38 (capitalization original).)

On June 18, 2012, Nay filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging counsel was ineffective in a variety of ways. Nay also filed a motion for
appointment of counsel, which the district court denied. (R., pp.22-24, 27.) The
state filed an answer, and the court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss ("Notice").
(R., pp.31-33, 37-45.) Nay filed a response to the court's Notice, after which the

court entered an Order of Dismissal. (R., pp.51-54, 56-57.)
Nay filed a timely notice of appeal from the Order of Dismissal and a
request for counsel on appeal. 1 (R., pp.59-63, 72-74.) The district court denied
Nay's request for appellate counsel. (R., p.77.)
On appeal, the state filed a Motion for Remand and Statement in Support
Thereof ("Motion"), requesting remand of this case "for consideration of Nay's
motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel to determine whether his
petition alleges the possibility of a valid claim (as opposed to whether it was
subject to summary dismissal without an evidentiary hearing)." (Motion, p.6, filed
December 11, 2013.)

The Idaho Supreme Court granted the Motion and

suspended the appeal. (Order Granting Motion for Remand to the District Court,
dated January 15, 2014.)

1

After Nay filed his Notice of Appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded this
case for entry of final judgment. (R., p.78.) The district court entered a "Final
Judgment" on June 6, 2013. (R., p.79.)
2

On February 26, 2014, the district court entered a Second Order Denying
Appointment of Counsel ("Second Order")2 after which the Court, by email
notification dated March 7, 2014, reset the due date for the Respondent's brief. 3

2

Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to augment the record
with the district court's Second Order.
3

The state assumes this notice also serves as an order reinstating this appeal.
3

ISSUES
Nay states the issues on appeal as:
1).

Did the Petitioner present a "preponderance of evidence" in
the District Court, which should have precluded dismissal of
the Petition for Post Conviction Relief

2).

Did the District Court err when it denied the Motion for
Appointment of Counsel during the Post Conviction
Proceeding?

3).

Did the District Court err when it refused to appoint counsel
for appellate purposes?

4).

Is the Appellant entitled to appeal the length of his sentence,
and if so, is counsel obligated to file such an appeal?

(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.11.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:

1.
Should this Court decline to consider any "claim" that the district
court erred in denying his request for post-conviction and appellate counsel since
Nay has failed to support any such "claim" with argument and authority?
Alternatively, has Nay failed to show the possibility of a valid claim that entitled
him to the appointment of counsel?
2.
Because none of Nay's claims were possibly valid, has Nay
necessarily failed to establish error in the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
Nay Has Waived Any Claim Related To The Appointment Of Counsel;
Alternatively, He Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motions For
Appoint Of Post-Conviction And Appellate Counsel

A

Introduction
In his statement of the issues, Nay complains the district court erred in

denying his "otion for appoint of counsel during the post conviction proceeding"
and "when it refused to appoint counsel for appellate purposes." (Appellant's
Brief, p.11 (capitalization altered).) Because Nay does not support either of these
claims with argument and authority, this Court should decline to consider them.
Alternatively, Nay has failed to show error in the denial of either of his requests
for counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether to grant or deny a post-conviction petitioner's request for court-

appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the trial court. Eby v. State, 148
Idaho 731,738,228 P.3d 998, 1005 (2010).

C.

Nay Has Waived Any Claim Related To The Appointment Of Counsel By
Failing To Support It With Argument And Authority
Nay's statement of the issues includes the district court's failure to appoint

counsel to represent him in either the post-conviction proceedings or on appeal;
however, he failed to support either of these claims with argument and authority.
(See generally R., pp.1-10.) Although Nay cites authority in his brief, none of the
authority he cites relates to the appointment of counsel either in post-conviction
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or on appeal. With respect to argument to support his claims, Nay asserts he
showed by a "preponderance of the Evidence" that he is "entitled to the relief
sought, and therefore the Court erred when it failed to appoint Counsel to Assist
[him]."

(Appellant's Brief, p.5 (capitalization original).)

These conclusory

statements, unsupported by authority, should not be considered by this Court.
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 (2010)
(citations omitted) ("Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error
with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. A general attack
on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to
evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue.").

D.

Even If Considered, Nay Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His
Requests For Counsel
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is

governed by I.C. § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the
UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an applicant who
is unable to pay the costs of representation." Murphy v. State, 2014 WL 712695
*3 (2014) (citing I.C. § 19-4904; Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102
P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004 )).

"The standard for determining whether to appoint

counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is whether the
petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Murphy at *3 (citing
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007)). "In deciding
whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid claim, the trial court
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should consider whether the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with
adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further
investigation into the claims." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12,
15 (2007).

A "petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to

search the record for possible nonfrivolous claims."

JJ:L

Further, if the claims in

the petition are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they
could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel and
further investigation, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed
with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions.
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007).
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 ), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102
P. 3d at 1111 .
On remand, the district court denied Nay's request for counsel, stating:
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On June 29, 2012, this Court denied counsel pending review
of the case and advised that counsel would be appointed if the
petition was not subject to summary dismissal. The record was
reviewed and the petition was subject to summary dismissal. The
Court had ordered the transcripts of the plea and sentencing
hearings and considered the Guilty Plea Advisory forms. A review
of all of the foregoing information and consideration of the petition
itself led to the conclusion that there was not the possibility of a
valid claim that any reasonable person would hire an attorney, at
his or her own expense, to pursue. It is in the Court's discretion to
decide if counsel should be appointed and it is the practice of this
Court to appoint one as soon as a review of all key information
indicates even the sliver of an issue. Because the review did not
reveal even the possibility of a valid claim, no counsel was
appointed.
(Second Order, pp.1-2.)

The court also noted it denied Nay's request for

appellate counsel "because no meritorious issues were raised." (Second Order,
p.2.)

The district court correctly concluded Nay was not entitled to appointed

counsel.
Nay alleged six ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his petition.
Specifically, Nay alleged counsel was ineffective (1) "when he failed to suppress
non-Mirandized statements to the police," (2) "by not correcting mis-information
in the P.S.I.," (3) "by convincing and inducing [Nay's] reliance on assertions of a
sentence of 5+10 at most," (4) "encouraging [Nay] to plead guilty in the place of
preparing a defense," (5) "by failing to file a Rule 35 on both convictions," and (6)
"by failing to file an appeal upon denial of [the] Rule 35." (R., pp.6-7.) The court
indicated it reviewed the "transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings and
considered the Guilty Plea Advisory forms" to determine whether Nay's petition
alleged a possibly valid claim and concluded it did not. A review of those items
supports the district court's conclusion.
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During his guilty plea colloquy to the vehicular manslaughter charge, the
court asked Nay if he made "any kind of confession or admission to the police in
this case" and Nay responded, "No ma'am."

(#38322 Tr. 4 , p.13, Ls.14-16.)

Although Nay claims in his supporting affidavit that the police "questioned" him in
the hospital "while [he was] fading in and out of consciousness" and did so
without providing Miranda warnings, he does not identify what incriminating
statements were made.

However, shortly after the court asked Nay during his

plea colloquy if he made "any kind of confession or admission," and he denied as
much, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor, the court, and
defense counsel:
[PROSECUTOR]: Going back to the question Your Honor
asked about whether he made a confession to the police, there was
an interview with the police. I don't know if you would characterize
it as a confession, necessarily, but that's something Your Honor
maybe should know, in all candor.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I have discussed this with Mr.
Nay, and he did conduct an interview with the police. He did not
given any information that ultimately, I think, led to his immediate
conviction.
And we went over whether or not a suppression motion
would be in order, and we made the determination that a

4

Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to take judicial notice
of the transcript from Docket No. 38322 and the Guilty Plea Advisory Forms from
Nay's underlying criminal cases, all of which the district court considered in
relation to Nay's post-conviction petition. For the Court's convenience, the Guilty
Plea Advisory Forms are attached hereto as Appendices A and B.
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suppression motion was not going to be necessary.[5]
THE COURT: Well, of course, that's addressed on page 5
of the guilty plea examination form in Questions 22 and 23
specifically.
(#38322 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-21.)
Question 22 of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form asks whether there "any
motions or other requests for relief' Nay "believe[s] should still be filed in this
case." (Appendix A, p.6.) Nay circled "No." (Id.) Question 23 asks whether Nay
understood that if he entered an unconditional plea he would be unable to
"challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea" including "any issues
about any statements [he] may have made to law enforcement."

(Id.)

Nay

circled "Yes." (Id.) Nay did not disagree with either his counsel's representations
regarding the suppression issue or the validity of his responses on the Advisory
Form. To the contrary, he advised the court during his plea colloquy that counsel
had not failed to do anything Nay wanted him to do, which presumably includes

5

During his factual basis, the prosecutor later indicated that when Nay "talked to
the officer in the hospital a few days after" the accident, he first denied using
methamphetamine or amphetamine but when the officer told Nay they had Nay's
urine, Nay said, "Well, it's going to be hot for methamphetamine" and "admitted
that he had used into the day before -- two days before." (#38322 Tr., p.24,
Ls.12-20.) Presumably counsel's decision to forego the suppression motion and
take advantage of the plea offer was based on a conclusion that, even if Nay
obtained a favorable suppression ruling, he would still be convicted based on the
blood test results. This is a well-recognized strategic and tactical decision. See
Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733 (2011) (holding that state post-conviction court's
conclusion that counsel was not deficient in advising defendant to enter "a quick
no-contest plea" without first filing a motion to suppress defendant's confession
was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
precedent); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 972 (9 th Cir. 2006) ("Even ...
one of Weaver's expert witnesses, agreed with the State's suggestion that an
attorney would not file a motion to suppress if it were in the client's best interests
to negotiate the most favorable plea bargain possible.").
10

the suppression motion they discussed, and that he understood the Advisory
Form and voluntarily and truthfully answered all questions included in that form.
(#38322 Tr., p.16, L.25- p.17, L.2, p.18, Ls.7-25.)
Also notable is that in responding the court's Notice in relation to this
claim, where the court noted Nay "did not explain which statements made to
police he wanted suppressed" (R., p.43), he did not expound on the allegation
but merely repeated "it is the statements given at the hospital" (R., p.52). Nor did
he explain why counsel's decision not to file a suppression motion, made in
consultation

with

Nay,

constituted

ineffective

assistance.

Under

the

circumstances, the district court correctly concluded Nay failed to raise a possibly
valid claim regarding counsel's failure to file a suppression motion. See McKay
v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) ("If the record
conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim, summary
dismissal is appropriate."). 6
There is no possibility that Nay's second and third claims are valid either
because they, too, are disproved by the record.

Regarding the presentence

report, which Nay alleged contained letters written by the victim's parents that
contained "false information" to which counsel should have objected, this issue
was addressed at the outset of the sentencing hearing. The prosecutor advised
the court:

6

Although this legal principle is stated in the context of summary dismissal as
opposed to whether there is a possibility of a valid claim for purposes of
appointing counsel, the state submits that it applies equally to the latter since
claims disproved by the record cannot possibly be valid.
11

Judge, there is one discrepancy I would like to point out, and
that is with regards to this latest addendum to the presentence
investigation for the letter, it's a two-page single-spaced letter, in
the form, basically, of an e-mail from Ms. Valerie Spencer directed
to Your Honor dated the 18th of November.
In the last paragraph, Judge, she references a meeting that
we had in which she claims that I told her that the defendant had
wrote a letter saying that, quote, "Tom had deserved to die, and
that it was Tom's fault that he died," and she felt like she had been
kicked in the stomach.
I have reviewed that -- that struck me as inaccurate. And, in
fact, I believe ... it is inaccurate, and I talked to the victim witness
coordinator to make sure that that was also her point of view on it,
and she agreed .

. . . And so, Judge, I think what she's referring to is what's
included in the presentence investigation report. I don't -- this is -the page isn't numbered, but there is a typed -- a handwritten letter
from the defendant to his girlfriend ... in which the defendant talks
about how that the victim took his life into his own hands because
his seat wasn't bolted, et cetera, and those were things that we
shared as far as telling them what we think that the defensive
strategy was going to be in the case.
It wasn't a matter of us telling the victim -- and I can't control
too much. I didn't realize there was a miscommunication going on
there. We never said that he deserved to die, or anything like
that[.]
(#38322 Tr., p.39, L.12 - p.41, L.2.)
Trial counsel subsequently addressed the issue stating, "And we were
also troubled by that. We thank the State for the correction and the clarification
on that. There was certainly no intent on Mr. Nay's part to at all besmirch the
name of the victim of this crime."

(#38322 Tr., p.41, L.23 - p.42, L.2.) Trial

counsel also reiterated during his sentencing recommendation that Nay was
remorseful and aware that "[i]t [was] because of his negligence that Tom Spencer
12

is no longer with us, and he feels that every day[.]" (#38322 Tr., p.50, Ls.4-15.)
Nay himself also expressed his remorse and acknowledged his actions resulted
in the victim's death. (#38322 Tr., p.55, L.23 - p.57, L.1.) The record, therefore,
disproves any validity to Nay's second claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the letter in the PSI.
Nay's third claim is that counsel "convinc[ed] and induc[ed] [his] reliance
on assertions of a sentence of 5+10 at most."

(R., p.6.)

However, even

assuming defense counsel predicted that Nay would receive a "sentence of 5+10
at most," the plea agreement itself put Nay on notice of the potential sentences
that could be imposed and the district court disabused Nay of any such belief
before he pied guilty. In the vehicular manslaughter case, the state agreed to
recommend 13 years fixed. (#38322 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-23; Appendix A, p.4.) In the
delivery case, the state agreed to recommend "15 to life." (#38322 Tr., p.7, Ls.18; Appendix A, p.4.) The court, during Nay's plea colloquy, advised him the "plea
bargain agreement is simply a recommendation" that was "not binding on the
court." (#38322 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-22.) Nay acknowledged he was "aware of that."
(#38322 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-25.)

Nay also specifically acknowledged the non-

binding nature of the plea agreement in the Guilty Plea Advisory Forms by
initialing the following statement:

I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea
agreement. This means that the judge is not bound by the
agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose
any sentence authorized by law, up to the maximum sentence for
any offense. Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if
the district chooses not to follow the agreement, I will not have the
right to withdraw my guilty plea.

13

(Appendix A, p.4; Appendix B., p.4.) Nay also stated, under oath, that nobody
promised him leniency as a result of his plea nor offered him any "reward or
incentive to plead guilty." (#38322 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-14, 19-21.)
Although the plea agreement allowed the defense to request a lesser
sentence than that being recommended by the state, and that authorized by law,
and trial counsel may have been hopeful that the court would grant his request
for retained jurisdiction with an underlying sentence of 15 years, with five years
fixed (#38322 Tr., p.55, Ls.9-11), this does not mean counsel was ineffective in
making a prediction about the likelihood of any particular sentence. See, ~ .
Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009) (a
petitioner cannot show ineffective assistance where court advised him of the
consequences of his guilty plea and even "a good faith assurance of leniency or
a mere prediction by a defense counsel to a defendant of the sentence
anticipated is no grounds for post conviction relief although the sentence
imposed is greater than predicted"). Accordingly, there is no possible validity to
Nay's third claim.
Nay's fourth claim also suffers from lack of validity when considered in
light of his statements during his underlying criminal cases.

Rather than

supporting his assertion that counsel "encourag[ed]" him to "plead guilty in the
place of preparing a defense," the record shows Nay wanted to plead guilty and
Nay has failed to identify any valid defense. (R., p.11.) According to his affidavit,
Nay wanted counsel to pursue a potential defense that involved "get[ting] toxcounts on the blood and urine" and "seek[ing] out a specialist."
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(R., p.11.)

According to Nay, counsel said "he talked to one, but thought [Nay] would be
better off not wasting [his] time on it." (R., p.11.) Nay complained he "believe[d]
counsel was merely passifying [sic] [him]." (R., p.11.) This is not a possibly valid
claim for several reasons. First, there is no basis for concluding that counsel did
not do precisely what he told Nay he did - consulted a specialist on the issue.
Second, there is no basis for concluding that the test results actually obtained
were invalid or otherwise subject to impeachment. Third, when pleading guilty to
vehicular manslaughter, to which this allegation presumably relates, Nay said he
had "been wanting to plead guilty for quite a while," was satisfied with his
lawyer's actions, denied he wanted counsel to talk to any additional witnesses,
and that he was pleading guilty free and voluntarily.

(#38322 Tr., p.16, L.7 -

p.17, L.5, p.18, Ls.7-25, p.22, Ls.15-17.) His Guilty Plea Advisory Form reflected
many of these same sentiments. (Appendix A, pp.4-5.) In light of the foregoing,
Nay's fourth claim is not possibly valid.
In his fifth claim, Nay contends counsel was ineffective for "failing to file a
Rule 35 on both convictions."

(R., p.6.)

Nay is correct in his assertion that

counsel did not file a Rule 35 motion in his vehicular manslaughter case.
Counsel did, however, file a Rule 35 motion in his delivery case. 7 (Motion for
Reconsideration of Sentence, filed March 17, 2011 (augmentation).) The brief
filed in support of that motion explains why such a motion was not filed:
"Defendant is not requesting a reduction in the Court's sentence imposed in CR-

7

The state's motion to augment also includes a request to augment the record
with the Rule 35 pleadings filed in relation to CR-FE-2010-0012576, which were
augmented to the record in Nay's direct appeal.
15

FE-2010-009990 [the manslaughter case] as it was just for him to receive said
sentence."

(Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of

Sentence, filed March 17, 2011 (augmentation).)

Indeed, it was the very

underlying sentence counsel requested on that charge; not to mention the
sentence Nay identifies in his post-conviction petition as the sentence counsel
allegedly told him he would receive.

(R., p.11.)

It was hardly deficient for

counsel not to ask for a reduction when the court imposed the sentence he
requested.

Nor is there any possible validity to an assertion that Nay was

prejudiced as a result of counsel's failure to do so. This is especially true where,
as here, the sentence on which counsel sought Rule 35 relief was far greater (life
with seven years fixed) than the sentence for which he did not seek relief (15
years with five fixed). Claim five is not possibly valid.
Finally, Nay's sixth claim is also not possibly valid.

In claim six, Nay

contends counsel failed to appeal the "denial of [the] Rule 35."

(R., p.6.)

Although there was no separate notice of appeal filed after the court denied
Nay's Rule 35 motion, appellate counsel augmented the record on appeal with
the Rule 35 pleadings. That information was available for consideration by the
appellate court and the Court referenced the Rule 35 in its opinion. State v. Nay,
Docket Nos. 38322 & 38323, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 615 (Sept. 14, 2011
Ct. App). Claim six is not possibly valid.
Given that Nay failed to raise the possibility of any valid claim, Nay cannot
show error in the district court's decision to deny his request for post-conviction
counsel, much less is subsequent request for appellate counsel.
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II.
Nay Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His PostConviction Petition

A.

Introduction
Nay argues the court erred in dismissing his petition because, he asserts,

he "in fact

met the

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

necessary 'preponderance

of evidence'

standard."

This is not the relevant legal standard for summary

dismissal; nevertheless, Nay failed to meet the applicable standard and has
therefore failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803 (citing GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Nay Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
17

583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

While a court must accept a

petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief,
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing
the petition.

!fl (citing

Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220

(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

~

Because Nay failed to satisfy the lesser standard of showing a possibly
valid claim, he has necessarily failed to meet the higher standard of showing a
genuine issue of material fact that would entitle him to avoid summary dismissal.
Thus, for the reasons articulated in Section I, supra, Nay has failed to show error
in the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's orders
denying Nay's requests for counsel and summarily dismissing Nay's petition for
post-conviction relief.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2014.

ICA M. LORELLO
Dep ty Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of April, 2014, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DOUGLAS NAY, #56217
I.S.C.I.
P.O. BOX 14
BOISE, ID 83707

/
Deputy
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M. LORELLO
torney General
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Guilty Plea Advisory Form for use in Judge Bail's ocr 6 ·-- 2010
8;·_~A~~~
Court
Defendant's Name: D0,~u.S .Q, t':?--bl
DliPVTv
,
Date: I OI€ J 10
•

Case Number: c.R- EE-- lo - ooocff}O
Sentence range on charges for which a guilty plea is being entered:
\)e\\; c . !'f\c.N;.~inimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: \5 )f f g/\,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: _ _ __
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty:. _ _ __
_ _ _ _..,____Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: _ _ _ __

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA
OF GUILTY
(PLEASE L'VITIAL EACH RESPONSE)
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything
about the crime( s) you are accused of committing. If you elected to have a
trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions.
However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial. en/
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of
guilty to the, crime( s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under
State v. Estrada. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after
pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any
question or to provide any information that might tend to show you
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s)
to which you are pleading guilty. If you do waive your rights under Estrada,
you do not have the right to refuse to answer any question or provide any
information that might tend to show you committed some other
crime(s) ..!Jd_
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect
to answering questions or providing information that may increase my
sentence unless I waive my rights under Estrada, in which case, I understand
that I must talk freely and openly with the presentence investigator and with
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any evaluators regardless of whether it may tend to incriminate me in some
other crime(s).w
3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an
attorney and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who
will be paid by the county. Or-(

4. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: I) you
plead guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed
innocent.t:t:l

5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a
proceeding to determine whether you are guilty of the charge(s) brought
against you. You are presumed to be innocent of having committed any
crime until and unless the State proves you are guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. In a jury trial, all evidence is submitted to members of this
community who serve as jurors. You and your attorney will have a role in
choosing the people who sit on your jury. In a jury trial, you have the right
to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense if you
want to although the decision to testify is entirely up to you. No one can
force you to testify at your trial. The State must convince each and every
one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

I understand thattPeading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and
public jury trial.
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This means that
the witnesses who testify against you in your jury trial will be placed under
oath and will testify in your presence and be subject to questioning by your
attorney. You also have the right to call witnesses of your choosing to
testify on your behalf. You have the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses who will testify for you and, if you cannot afford to bring those
witnesses to court, they will be paid for at public expense.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront and
cross examine the witnesses against me, and to present witnesses and
evidence in my defense.12::y'
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QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question
consult your attorney before answerin2,)

PLEASE CIRCLE ONE
1. Do you read and write the English language?~NO
If not, have you been provided wJth. an interpreter to
help you fill out this form? YES'NO

2. What is your age?,sD
3. What is yt,ur true legal
c f!A/20 {'-__(A'-/
name? D n"'-~ \ ,__s.
4. How far did you go in school? I 'L
If you did not complete high school, have you received
either a general education diploma or high school
equivalency diploma?~NO

Le

5. Are you currently under the care of a mental
health professional?

YES(@

6. Have you: ever been diagnosed with a mental
health disorder?~ NO
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made?
f\ C') +:I Q, Ot-..Nf) DtrPLe$ (c)4 (
'26o3'

7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? YES~
If so, have you taken your prescription medication
during the past 24 hours? YES(@)
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications
or drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages
which you believe affect your ability to make a reasoned
and informed decision in this case? YE@=)
9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable
to make a ~ e d and informed decision in this
case?YE~
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11. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement.
This means that the judge is not bound by the agreement or any
sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized
by law, up to the maximum sentence for any offense. Because the court
is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow
the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.o.!{
12. As a term of your plea agreemen~e you pleading
guilty to more than one crime? YESW
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently
(at the same time) or consecutively ( one after
the other)@ NO
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues? YES@
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal?
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment
of conviction and sentence as part of your plea
agreement? YES :@
15. Have any other promises been made to you which
have influenced your decision to plead guilty? YE~
If so, .what are those promises?

16.Do you feel you have had ~ient time to discuss
your case with your attorney?@§ NO
17. Have you to!~r attorney everything you know
about the crime·.~ NO
Judge Bail's guilty plea fonn rev'd S/18/10
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18. Is there anything you have requ~ your attorney
to do that has not been done? YES@,}
If yes, please
explain.

-------------------------

I 9. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor
relating to your case. This may include police
reports, witness statements, tape recordings, photographs,
reports of scientific testing, etc. This is called
discovery. Have you reviewed ~~nee provided to
your attorney during discovery'!~NO
20.Have you told your attorney about any witnesses
who would show your innocence? YES@) I .Affl G:L-t<'---c-y
2 I. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you
will waive any defenses, both factual a~al, that
NO
you believe you may have in this case?
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief
that you believe should still be filed in this case? YES~
If so, what motions or
requests?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to
challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea
including: 1) any searches or seizures that occurred in
your case, 2) any issues concerning the method or
manner of your arrest, and 3) any issues about any
statements you may have made to law enforcement'@No
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty,
you are admitting the truth of each and every allegation
contained in the charge(s) to which you plead
guilty@NO
~
25. Are you currently on probation or parole@NO
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this
case could be the basis of a violation of that probation
or parole?~ NO
26.Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the
United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual
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admissions could have consequences of deportation
or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the
United States, or ~ of an application for United
States citizenship?~ NO
27.Are you required by the crime to which you will
plead guilty to register as a sex offender? (LC. § 18-8304) YES~
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case?
(LC. § 19-5304)@ NO
29.Have you agreed to pay restitution to any other
party as a condition of your plea agreement? YE@:)
If so, to whom?
30. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension
as a result of a guilty plea in this case? YES NO
If so, for how long must your license
be suspended?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
31. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a
mandatory domestic violence, substance abuse, or
psychosexual evaluation is requi~ (LC. §§ 18918(7)( a),-8005(9),-8317) Y E ~
32. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you
may be required to pay the costs of prosecution and
investigation? (I.C. § 37-2732A(K)) YES@
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you
will be required to S':_~ a DNA sample to the state?
(I.C. § 19-5506) YE~
34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the
court could impose a fine for a crime of violence of up
to $5,000, pay~bto the victim of the crime? (I.C. §
19-5307) YE
0
35. Do you un erstand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will
lose your right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, §
3)~NO
367Yc(you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will
lose your right to h~ublic office in Idaho? (ID.
CONST. art. 6, § 3 ~ NO
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will

--------------
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lose your right to perf9r!n jury service in Idaho? (ID.
CONST. art. 6, § 3~NO
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony you will lose your righ!..~-I2¥,~c11ase, possess, or
carry firearms? (I.C. § 18-310~0
39. Do you understand that no one, including your~_
attorney, can force you to plead guilty in this case?~NO
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily?@S NO
41. Are you pleading guilty because you did commit
the acts alleged in the information or indictment?@s>NO
42. lfyou were provided with an interpreter to help
you fill out this form, have you had any trouble understanding
your interpreter? YES NO
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the
questions in this form which you could not resolve by
discussing the issue with your attorney? YES'@)

I have answered the guestions on each page of this Guilty Plea
Advisory form truthfully, I understand all of the questions and
answers in this form, and I have discussed each question and
answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely
and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do
filh

Dated this day of ;a /0

, 20 l b

.

ve discussed, in detail, the
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APPENDIX B

Guilty Plea Advisory Form for use in Judge Bail's OCT l 2 2010
Court
J. oAv@~. crerJ
f

Defendant's Name: D~eS ~, Nc-.y
ev -Date: C)Z.---F[; - 2'.p\o.,.. oo I Z516
Case Number:
Sentence range on charges for which a guilty plea is being entered:
~li'lleC'( ~~Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty:~lrt:-e.,__,_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: _ _ __
_ _ _ _ _ _ _Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: _ _ __
- - - - ~__Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: _ _ __

DEPUTY

---------------------

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA
OF GUILTY
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE)
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything
about the crime(s) you are accused of committing. If you elected to have a
trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions.
However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial.W
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of
guilty to the· crime( s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under
State v. Estrada. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after
pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any
question or to provide any infonnation that might tend to show you
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime( s)
to which you are pleading guilty. If you do waive your rights under Estrada,
you do not have the right to refuse to answer any question or provide any
information that might tend to show you committed some other
crime(s).'Cd_
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect
to answering questions or providing information that may increase my
sentence unless I waive my rights under Estrada, in which case, I understand
that I must talk freely and openly with the presentence investigator and with
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any evaluators regardless of whether it may tend to incriminate me in some
other crime(s).oc_
3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an
attorney and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who
will be paid by the county.~
4. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: 1) you
plead guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed
innocent&Af
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a
proceeding to determine whether you are guilty of the charge( s) brought
against you. You are presumed to be innocent of having committed any
crime until and unless the State proves you are guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. In a jury trial, all evidence is submitted to members of this
community who serve as jurors. You and your attorney will have a role in
choosing the people who sit on your jury. In a jury trial, you have the right
to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense if you
want to although the decision to testify is entirely up to you. No one can
force you to testify at your trial. The State must convince each and every
one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I understand th@,
by leading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and
public jury trial
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This means that
the witnesses who testify against you in your jury trial will be placed under
oath and will testify in your presence and be subject to questioning by your
attorney. You also have the right to call witnesses of your choosing to
testify on your behalf. You have the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses who will testify for you and, if you cannot afford to bring those
witnesses to court, they will be paid for at public expense.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront and
cross examine the witnesses against me, and to present witnesses and
evidence in my defense.0/\../
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QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA
(PJease answer every question. If you do not understand a question
consult your attorney before answering.)
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE
1. Do you read and write the English language? tgg NO
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to
help you fill out this form? YES NO

2. What is your age? h.Q
3. What is your true legal
name? [)01:1, c,½AS-. 6 {&J
4. How far did you go in school?_,('---'(__
If you did not complete high school, have you received
either a general education diploma or high school
equivalency diploma?<YES>NO
5. Are you currently under~are of a mental
health professional? YES~
6. Have you: ever~ diagnosed with a mental
health disorder~O
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made?
A-w¼,LT Ao f:{ ~
Dcrl-fi~-/S r0,.A- (

f

7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? YES@
If so, have you taken your prescription medication
during the past 24 hours? YES NO
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications
or drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages
which you believe affect your ability to make a reasoned
and informed decision in this case? Y E ~
9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable
to make a ~oned and informed decision in this
case?YESNO
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10. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? YES NO
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement?
£1e,se, :iJJ?...
~trv\ ·,"' cg- Fe ..-1 o-919'0

fl

p\e4.

11. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement.
This means that the judge is not bound by the agreement or any
sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized
by law, up to the maximum sentence for any offense. Because the court
is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow
the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.DrJ
12. As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading
guilty to more than one crime'!(yES NO
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently
(at the sa~e) or consecutively (one after
the other)'~JNO
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues? YE@
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal?
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment
of conviction an~tence as part of your plea
agreement? Y E ~
15. Have any other promises been made to you whi~
have influenced your decision to plead guilty? YES~
If so, .what are those promises?

16.Do you feel you have ha~cient time to discuss
your case with your attomey'(y:Es NO
17. Have you tol~r attorney everything you know
about the crime?~NO
Judge Bail's guilty pica fonn rcv'd S/18/10
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18. Is there anything you have requ~ your attorney
to do that has not been done? YESr~
If yes, please
explain. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I 9. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor
relating to your case. This may include police
reports, witness statements, tape recordings, photographs,
reports of scientific testing, etc. This is called
discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence provided to
your attorney during discoverym'S NO
20.Have you told your attorne/aoo;:;t an~)nesses
who would show your innocence? YES'~
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you
will waive any defenses, both factual an~~' that
you believe you may have in this case?-~O
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief
that you believe should still be filed in this case? YEs"w>
If so, what motions or
requests?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to
challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea
including: 1) any searches or seizures that occurred in
your case, 2) any issues concerning the method or
manner of your arrest, and 3) any issues about any
statements you may have made to law enforcement@No
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty,
you are admitting the truth of each and every allegation
containeJ4.t! the charge(s) to which you plead
guilty?~NO
25. Are you currently on probation or parole?@ NO
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this
case coul~he basis of a violation of that probation
or parole~ NO
26.Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the
United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual
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admissions could have consequences of deportation
or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the
United States, or d ~ of an application for United
States citizenshi~ NO
27.Are you required by the crime to which you will
plead guilty to register as a sex offender? (I.C. § 18-8304) YE,$@
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be
required to pay ~tion to the victims in this case?
(LC. §19-5304)~ NO
29.Have you agreed to pay restitution to any other
party as a condition of your plea agreement?~O
If so, to whom?_S_..;_-:1"__,,_'J:',.:_--=-......,._--'E
\
=-------30. Is there a mandatory driver's license su~ion
as a result of a guilty plea in this case? YEs...N())
If so, for how long must your license
be suspended?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
3 1. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a
mandatory domestic violence, substance abuse, or
psychosexual evaluation is reguired? (I.C. §§ 189 I 8(7)(a),-8005(9),-83 I 7 @ NO
3 2. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you
may be required to pay the costs of p~cution and
investigation? (J.C. § 37-2732A(K))<.Y:ES NO
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you
will be required to s u ~ DNA sample to the state?
(I.C. § 19-5506) YE$._N0'
34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the
court could impose a fine for a crime of violence ofup
to $5,000, pay~o the victim of the crime? (LC. §

19-5307) Y E ~
35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will
l ~ u r right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, §
3)~NO
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will
lose your right to hoJ4.Rublic office in Idaho? (ID.
CONST. art. 6, § 3)lYE$ NO
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will
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lose your right to peifQrm jury service in Idaho? (ID.
CONST. art. 6, § 3){yf.s'NO
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony you will lose your righ~~c?ase, possess, or
carry firearms? (LC.§ 18-310~0
39. Do you understand that no one, including your
attorney, can force you to plead guilty in this case? ~ O
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntaril~ NO
41. Are you pleading guilty because you did com~
the acts al1eged in the information or indictmen~NO
42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help
you fill out this form, have you had any trouble understanding
your interpreter? YES NO
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the
questions in this form which you could not r e ~ by
discussing the issue with your attorney? YE$li{Y

I have answered the questions on each pa2e of this Guilty Plea
Advisory form truthfully, I understand all of the questions and
answers in this form, and I have discussed each question and
answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely
and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do
fil!:

LDftz_

Dated this day of ~ , 20 /C) .

D ~
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